An Alternate Case Scenario: Sheila is caught

[Erik Narramore]

In a scenario in which Sheila is guilty but survives, very probably she would have been deemed to lack mental capacity to stand trial.  There would then have been what is called a 'trial of the facts', in which a jury decides whether the mentally-impaired accused committed the acts that form the basis of the alleged offences.

The choice before the jury in a trial of the facts is to either decide the allegations are true or are not true.  Note: this is not the same as deciding whether the accused is guilty of the offences.

Assuming the jury were to have found the allegations true, then the court would very likely have sentenced Sheila to a hospital order with a restriction order - meaning she is confined in a secure hospital and cannot be discharged without an order of a Mental Health Review Tribunal (as they are now called) or a government minister.

The next question is whether Sheila can inherit the estate.

Section 1 of the Forfeiture Act 1982 refers to something called the forfeiture rule, an old common law rule that anybody convicted of homicide cannot benefit from the estate of the victim.

the "forfeiture rule" means the rule of public policy which in certain circumstances precludes a person who has unlawfully killed another from acquiring a benefit in consequence of the killing.

Link: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1982/34/section/1

Section 2(2) allows the court to modify the way the rule is applied, where it is considered just to do so: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1982/34/section/2

The law has no clear and consistent position on whether a criminal finding of fact is to be regarded as a 'conviction'.  It seems to depend on the issues involved and the area of law.  But note the wording of section 1: a criminal conviction is not expressly required, only a finding that somebody has unlawfully killed another.

Thus, the question in Sheila's case would rest on whether a culpable finding of fact in a homicide case amounts to a finding that Sheila unlawfully killed her parents for the purposes of the forfeiture rule in section 1.

I imagine the answer to that would be emphatically yes, because the jury in an adverse finding at a trial of the facts is only saying that the allegations are true and thus the accused is culpable, which in that situation would be sufficient to conclude that Sheila acted unlawfully, even if she is not legally 'guilty'.

However, this need not have defeated Sheila.  Her lawyers might have persuasively argued for section 2 relief, asking the court to consider the interests of the twins - which is a sympathetic argument.

[Erik Narramore]

This question could also potentially arise if Sheila had survived in your hypothetical scenario.

Again, what you are referring to is the English law on homicide.

As a rough guide:

Murder = Malice or recklessness
Manslaughter = Negligence or recklessness.  Negligence would be gross negligence, but it can be 'constructive' gross negligence.

In this case, a lawyer could put together a strained argument that Jeremy was negligent or reckless, but in my (layman's) opinion, it wouldn't fly.  There is an underlying 'elephant in the room' possibility that Jeremy set Sheila up, which would have been a looming presence in everybody's minds in this scenario, and in different circumstances the relatives may even have pursued it, but the problem is proving causation.

The relevant contemporary case on the test for gross negligence manslaughter is R. v Broughton, a 2020 case (link: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2020/1093.html), and I can't imagine the law in 1984 would have been very different: in which case, Jeremy's conduct, while certainly to be deprecated, would fall well short of gross negligence manslaughter - and that is before you even get into considering manslaughter based on recklessness.  It's immediately obvious that in the circumstances you outline, Jeremy would not have caused the deaths and he could not have anticipated death or serious harm simply by leaving out an uncharged firearm, with the ammunition taken out.

Remember also that the firearms cupboard was not lockable, and therefore a negligence/recklessness argument could in theory run even if Jeremy had properly left the firearms and ammunition in the cupboard itself, as it wasn't secure.  On that basis, you could ask: What was Jeremy supposed to do different?

There is also UK firearms law to consider.  I think something went on between Nevill and PC Dryland at the immediate last firearms inspection because it's obvious the cupboard was not lockable.  Nevill was clearly in breach of his firearms conditions, which is an offence under Part 1, section (2) of the Firearms Act 1968: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/27/enacted/data.xht?wrap=true.

Note the wording of section (2): Jeremy was not committing an offence by his failure to comply with any conditions of Nevill's firearm certificate.

There is the question of whether Jeremy was legally using the firearm.  I believe this is a ripe question because this is where we come to a possible explanation for Jeremy's story about trying to shoot rabbits.

The relevant statutory provision at that time was section 11(1) of the Firearms Act 1968, which permitted an uncertificated firearms user such as Jeremy to borrow a rifle from a certificated owner such as Nevill, provided this for "sporting purposes".

Link: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/27/part/I/crossheading/special-exemptions-from-sections-1-to-5/enacted?wrap=true

This was an exact re-enactment of the same exception in section 4(7) of the 1937 Firearms Act, which you can see here: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1937/12/section/4/enacted.  This was necessary as the 1968 repealed the 1937 Act entirely.  In the wake of the Hungerford Massacre of 1987, this borrowing exception was tightened-up by the 1988 Firearms (Amendment) Act, with a private property requirement.

Obviously, in view of the 1968 Act, rural people like the Bambers will have got the idea into their heads that shooting vermin and rabbits could be seen as a 'sporting purpose'.  I think there has to be some doubt about that and indeed there was a 1960 case, Morton v Chaney, that decided that shooting rats was not for a 'sporting purpose'.

Thus, Jeremy may have been committing a statutory offence in his use of the rifle.  One would also have to consider Nevill's firearms certificate to see if there were any authorisations on that granted by local police that may avail Jeremy pursuant to section 1 of the 1968 Act.  (A copy of Nevill's certificate is available on the Forum - but the small print is difficult to read).  If there is no local authorisation on the certificate, then a prosecution could have been brought against Jeremy under section 1 of the 1968 Act, but any such prosecution would rest on statutory interpretation and would go somewhat against local country practices, and I doubt the police would have taken it further, even in (or especially in) these tragic circumstances.

Furthermore, a conviction under section 1 would not trigger the forfeiture rule, as a section 1 firearms offence in this case would be of no relevance to causation in the matter of homicide.

[Erik Narramore]

I'm not sure Sheila would have been disinherited, as she would have had a sympathetic argument for the twins under section 2 of the Forfeiture Act.

Of course, if the twins are also dead, then Jeremy does inherit everything - but this is subject to any civil claims the relatives may decide they have on the estate, and he would not have complete control of the holiday park, as shares in the company that owned the park were split.

Jeremy would also be pretty dependent on the labour, input and co-operation of others in maintaining the value of the farms.  It would have been quite complex.  In regard to White House Farm itself, if he decided to live there or work the farm that came with its feoffdom, or both, then he would have to persuade the relevant trustees to enfeoff him, which may have involved a lengthy probationary period, and so on.