Could a cleared Jeremy Bamber be denied compensation?

[Erik Narramore]

Could Jeremy Bamber be denied compensation on the basis of culpability in the tragedy, due to poor firearms safety?

The statutory compensation scheme for miscarriages of justice is defined in sections 133(1) and 133(1ZA) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988:

133         Compensation for miscarriages of justice.

(1)Subject to subsection (2) below, when a person has been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the Secretary of State shall pay compensation for the miscarriage of justice to the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction or, if he is dead, to his personal representatives, unless the non-disclosure of the unknown fact was wholly or partly attributable to the person convicted.

(1ZA)For the purposes of subsection (1), there has been a miscarriage of justice in relation to a person convicted of a criminal offence in England and Wales or, in a case where subsection (6H) applies, Northern Ireland, if and only if the new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not commit the offence (and references in the rest of this Part to a miscarriage of justice are to be construed accordingly).

Link: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/33/section/133

Even if Jeremy were to overcome this hurdle, it is true that under the Ministry of Justice guidance, the assessor appointed by the Secretary of State can take account of the claimant's own conduct:

The assessor may take from the total amount of compensation that he would
otherwise have assessed as payable any deduction or deductions that he considers
appropriate by reason of either or both of the following:
a. Any conduct of the person appearing to the assessor to have directly or
indirectly caused, or contributed to, the conviction concerned; and
b. Any other convictions of the person and any punishment resulting from
them8
.
If, having had regard to any matters falling within (a) or (b), the assessor considers that
there are exceptional circumstances which justify doing so, he may determine that the
amount of compensation is to be a nominal amount only.

Link: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249339/Ch34.pdf

Even if Sheila did this, both Nevill and Jeremy were culpable in the tragedy due to poor firearms safety practices.  Nevill was clearly in breach of the conditions of his firearms certificate (an offence under section 1(1) of the 1968 Act) and may have obtained his certificate on the basis of false representations.  Depending on what the firearms certificate conditions were, Jeremy may also have been committing an offence under section 1(2) of the 1968 Act in using firearms without certification or authorisation.  I would not say shooting vermin is sport and Morton v Chaney [1960] indicates that the courts may agree, and that would certainly be my own interpretation of statute.

However, Jeremy's conduct would have to be viewed in the context of the mid-1980s, when Jeremy's indiscretion would be regarded as a technicality, at most, by rural Essex police.  If anything, it would have been considered strange for Jeremy not to have been using firearms.  He was a farmer's son after all.

There is the more serious possibility that Jeremy was actually setting Sheila up by leaving out the rifle and ammunition, but that won't get anywhere.  First, it makes no logical sense for Jeremy to do such a thing as he would then lose control of the outcome of the incident and his goals might then not be achieved.  Second, contrary to what a lot of people seem to think, Jeremy did not leave the rifle and ammunition out in Sheila's sight, rather they were left in the back kitchen/scullery area, which Sheila did not have a view of as she conversed with her parents in the main kitchen.

If Jeremy ever does have to submit a compensation claim, I doubt his culpability in the tragedy will be the main concern.  The problem will be the hurdle of section 133(1ZA).  The Secretary of State may decide to resolve it by offering him a confidential settlement with ex gratia compensation, but would the state risk that in this day and age, knowing that others in a similar position would then demand the same treatment and use the courts to force the state's hand?